This paper explores the socio-economic impacts and the associated policy responses to the collapse of MG Rover at Longbridge in Birmingham. Critically, it attempts to move beyond a 'standard' Taskforce narrative which emphasises the role of the regional response. While recognising that significant policy 'successes' were indeed evident at the regional level in anticipating and responding to the crisis, a wider perspective is required that situates this Taskforce response in (i) a fuller understanding of labour market precariousness (that in turn mitigates some of its policy 'successes'), and (ii) more local perspectives that highlight the local impacts of closure, the role of the neighbourhood level officials and the third sector in mediating these. Taking this broader perspective suggests that longer term, workers face a precarious situation and the need for policies to create and sustain 'good quality' jobs remains paramount. Adding in more local perspectives, a key lesson from the Longbridge experience for dealing with closures more generally is that the public policy responses must be: multi-dimensional in that they transcend narrow sector based concerns and addresses broader spatial impacts; inclusive in that they build on a broad coalition of economic and social stakeholders; and, long-term in that they acknowledge that adaptation takes many years. If anything, the Birmingham Longbridge experience demonstrates the difficulty of achieving such responses in the context of crisis where action is imperative and deliberation a luxury.
. Similarly, cities in the US, Australia, Belgium, France and Germany have all seen automotive plant closures enacted and/or announced in recent years. At the time of writing, Toyota has just announced that it will close its Altona Melbourne assembly plant, effectively ending mass car production in Australia after a wave of pull-outs by the big players, prompting reflection not only on why this has happened but on policy experience internationally. 1 In response to such closures, in several cases the UK Labour Government of 1997 to 2010 set up Taskforces (task-oriented, temporary, non-statutory partnerships with multi-sector but selective membership) to deal with the impacts of plant closures, most notably the MG Rover Taskforce. These partnerships became Labour's default vehicle for responding to industrial closure. Taskforces were characterised by their diversity in respect of sectoral and spatial remit. However, they had in common the provision of an institutional platform to permit rapid mobilisation of expertise and resources of national and regional stakeholders in response to economic crisis 2 .
This paper reports on the findings of research on the collapse of MG Rover in Birmingham in 2005, and explores its socio-economic impacts and the associated policy responses. 3 The paper highlights what key lessons were learned from what happened before, during and after the MG Rover closure in 2005 and the work of the Taskforce in tackling this 'crisis' situation. The paper responds to long-standing calls for a holistic assessment of industrial closure (cf. TOMANEY et al, 1999; PIKE, 2005) . The extant literature is highly compartmentalised, and often demarcated 1 See for example THE GUARDIAN (2014a and 2014b) . 2 Different types of Taskforce model can be outlined in the UK, such as employer-based Taskforces, sector-based Taskforces and varying area-based Taskforces (e.g. local, regional and national). Such Taskforces can bring together a range of actors to address shock situations. Some Taskforces can be seen as reactive and regenerative, operating over short time-scales, whereas others may be more proactive and developmental operating over longer time frames (PIKE, 2002) , with evolution between these modes as the scale and challenge of some shocks or potential shocks unfold. Area-based Taskforces may be seen as more likely to try to address longer-term economic restructuring needs. Taskforces can in turn be assessed in terms of the degree of multi-level working, the degree of devolved responsibility, to what extent a tailored policy response is developed, and also legitimacy (and on the latter communication of Taskforce interventions may be key) (BENTLEY et al, 2010b) . 3 The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) under award number RES-000-22-2478. For more detail on the MG Rover case study, see according to disciplinary boundaries. Typically, it focuses on either the impacts of closure (e.g. the labour market histories of redundant workers, the resilience of localities to rebound from such economic 'shocks'), or the policy response to closure (e.g. area regeneration, Taskforces). A dominant narrative has emerged in respect of
Taskforces. This is itself highly selective (cf. PIKE, 2002; BENTLEY et al, 2010b) ,
focusing on an evaluation of Taskforces according to their own terms of reference as an expression of industrial policy (e.g. facilitating the adjustment to closure of supply chain companies and redundant workers) or a critique of their multi-level governance arrangements (especially their restricted membership and corporatist modes of operation).
Indeed, narratives about Taskforces demonstrate how they take this collaborative governance approach at national and regional level to, at least, identify the most obvious and immediate problems faced by the newly redundant worker and devise a range of policies to help them deal with the problems. Those problems include the need to find a new job, the need for training and retraining, the need for financial support and, in particular, how to claim social security benefits. At best, Taskforces recognise that the newly redundant more broadly require advice on a range of financial matters, including entitlement to redundancy payments and pensions, advice on the payment of rent, mortgages and loans, but also on coping with job loss. There is evidence that the newly unemployed and their families can suffer physiological and psychological problems, akin to those associated with bereavement (BEER and THOMAS, 2007 mitigates some of its policy 'successes'), and (ii) more local perspectives that highlight the local impacts of closure, the role of the neighbourhood level officials and the third sector in mediating these.
Overall, this paper therefore attempts to adopt a holistic approach to better understanding plant closure in an automotive city, examining:
 What happened to ex-MG Rover workers after the closure? What have been the impacts of UK labour market regulation and the current economic crisis on their subsequent labour market experience?
 What have been the impacts on the communities where these workers lived in the city?
 What types of policy response have been put in place regionally and locally to deal with these impacts and have they been successful? 4 Accordingly, the paper is structured as follows. After a brief history to introduce the auto cluster in Birmingham and the wider region and MG Rover in particular, following sections discuss the data and methods used (notably, the use of a longitudinal survey and follow-up interviews), the context of the final collapse, then findings in terms of the impact on local labour markets and workers. This is then followed by a discussion and consideration of policy efforts and some critical broader perspectives going beyond the 'Taskforce narrative' before some concluding thoughts round off the paper.
Auto Production and MG Rover in Birmingham and the West Midlands: A Brief

History
The West Midlands region is one of the long standing areas of global motor industry production. The heyday of production was after World War 2 but, in the following decades, with open trade rules and globalisation, the industry declined. A popular view is that local companies could not compete in global arenas as a result of insufficient investment, poor labour relations, poor quality and cost control, andcritically -the lack of a supportive industrial policy on the part of the government.
Despite a number of foreign takeovers the industry's fortunes continued to decline.
The recent closures of the MG-Rover and Peugeot plants effectively ended volume manufacture in the region. In parallel there has been a decline in activities by the major suppliers. In recent years, Bosch has closed its automotive lighting plant in the north of the region and TRW its electric power steering plant in Birmingham. These changes have affected employment in the sector with a 34% reduction in the 10 years from 1997 to 2007 (ONS, 2008 ).
Yet in parallel to the decline in volume manufacture, recently there has been a relative growth of higher value or specialist production where profit margins are greater and which can (therefore) be more sustainable in a high wage cost economy.
Companies involved range from relatively large producers, such as Jaguar Land . This period coincided with manufacturing's peak in Birmingham and the wider West Midlands 6 , with manufacturing comprising some 65% of total employment in the region by 1961 (BRYSON et al., 1996; cited in BARBER and HALL, 2008: 283) . At this time, Birmingham and the West Midlands were characterised by rapid economic growth and prosperity, based on strengths in metal goods, motor vehicle and electrical equipment manufacturing.
However, the corporate conglomerate entity that was created in the early 1970s
(then named 'British Leyland') was unsuccessful, being characterised by low trust between units, poor quality, poor industrial relations, the lack of economies of scale and scope, and an inability to recover the (rising) costs of product development WILLIAMS et al., 1994) . After nationalisation in 1975, a long period of decline set in, with a gradual collapse of sales volumes and offloading of non-performing lines. As noted above, the city and the region were strongly hit by the recessions and manufacturing crisis of the 1970s and the 1980s, leading to significant levels of unemployment (BROWN et al., 2007) (BAILEY, 2003) . Given the on-going concern about Rover's long term prospects, the first Rover Taskforce (RTF1) also initiated spatial targeting via corridors of regeneration. However, the support actions arising out of the first Rover Taskforce were, for the most part, not based upon cluster concepts of networks but on 'old fashioned' industrial policy interventions.
The 'final' collapse of MG Rover in February 2005 then, although widely predicted by industry experts, sent shockwaves through the region. Aside from the direct loss of some 6300 jobs, the firm's turnover accounted for as much as 1% of regional GDP and £200 million a year in government revenue alone was lost (BAILEY and KOBAYASHI, 2008) . 7 The firm ceased operations owing £1.4 billion to creditors, with £109 million owed to UK-based suppliers (HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2006). MG Rover's inability to pay its suppliers and the resulting cash flow problems in the supply chain cut off supply into the factory and caused the final collapse. It also 7 On the decline and collapse of MG Rover, see Bailey and Kobayashi (2008) .
meant that it was impossible for the administrator to restart production. The collapse thus ended 100 years of car making on the Longbridge site. More jobs were lost in the supply chain. At first it was thought that as many as 12,000 jobs would be at risk but in the end the loss, estimated at 8,500 jobs, was less than initially expected (BAILEY and KOBAYASHI, 2008) . higher-value 'niche production' as noted above. Whilst an upsurge in demand, from emerging economies in particular, has seen the premium end of the sector benefit, with Jaguar Land Rover recently employing additional workers at its plants in the region (Bailey, 2013) , at the same time current developments in the Eurozone and the European auto market create uncertainty for auto firms operating in the UK (with mid-range producers such as GM and Honda particularly affected) with an impact on the supply chain.
Methods
The data used in this article consists of findings from a three-wave longitudinal SPENCER et al., 1986) . This process has continued into recent years: LARKIN (2009) 
Source: NOMIS local labour market data (2008).
This situation of relative labour market insecurity was further reinforced by a high Table 2 . This is highly concentrated in pockets of deprivation, where people have been unable to cope with the structural change that has unfolded around them. 
Key Findings
It needs to be borne in mind just how calamitous the sudden redundancies of 6,000 people could have been for the region. 8 Yet our findings suggest that at one level, adjustment for the ex-MG Rover workforce before the recession impacted had been successful; with approximately 90% of ex-MGR workers having obtained some form of employment in April 2008: with nearly three-quarters employed full-time, 11% self-employed and 5% employed part-time. In contrast, only 5% were still unemployed and looking for work. However, a majority of workers reported facing difficulty in finding employment, especially due to the number of people applying for the same job, age and lack of skills. Indeed, most workers had to convert to service sector work and were using different skills in 2008. Training played an important role in exworkers finding new jobs either in giving them confidence or in helping them learning new skills. Some 60% of workers interviewed in the third wave survey reported having undergone some form of training and education. Two thirds took up the offer of free training places offered by local agencies and many others underwent training by their new employers. But judged against national levels, it does appear that the ex-MGR workers moved into jobs with lower levels of autonomy, challenge and skill use, and fewer opportunities for progression than other workers in the UK.
Overall our research reveals a marked shift away from employment in manufacturing towards employment in service industries, mirroring the employment structure found in the wider UK economy. However, the proportion of our sample employed in manufacturing was still around double that of the regional average at that time as This occupational shift is also reflected in the type of skills that workers reported using in their current roles. More than 60% of those employed three years on stated that in their new jobs they were now using different skills to those they used at MG Rover . What was also evident was that the quicker people found re-employment post MG Rover, the more likely they were to use the same skills as at MG Rover in their new role (ibid). Interestingly, three years on some workers had changed occupational level. Roughly a third of workers surveyed reported higher occupational level roles three years on as compared to when at MG Rover, roughly a third reported a lower occupational status at wave three than they did previously, and roughly a third maintained a similar position over time ).
The need for workers to change their type of job and/or occupation to find employment resulted in significant pay cuts, with average pay falling by £5,640 per year in real terms by 2008. Two thirds of workers suffered wage falls while a third reported an increase in their salaries. The jobs at MG Rover were high quality manufacturing jobs paying above the average for the West Midlands region so it was always likely that workers would not be able to find directly comparable work.
Overall, the 31% of workers who stayed within the manufacturing sector earned similar amounts of money, but the 60% who moved into the service sector were mostly earning less. People who found work in four sectors -wholesale and retail, real estate and business services, education, and health and social work -took average cuts of more than £6,000 in annual income. This had repercussion in terms of households' finances. Almost a quarter of workers surveyed reported that they were in debt or were drawing down savings; 36% said they were just about able to manage on their current incomes; and a further 38% said they were in a position to save some money.
A more positive feature of this paper was that a majority of workers retrained to increase their employment opportunities or to change career or job. This was evident in that some 35% decided to retrain to increase their employment opportunities, 24% to change career, and 13% as a requirement of their new job. In contrast, only 8% took up training as an alternative to unemployment (and 7% because they were simply unable to find work with their qualifications). Of those workers who undertook training, around a half trained towards a recognised academic qualification (mostly vocational in nature). The very fact that ex-workers pursued specific forms of academic and vocational training in a range of demanded skills may help to explain some of this paper's key findings, notably the positive uptake of training opportunities, in contrast to research on other plant closures.
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In terms of specific support offered, job fairs and information on job opportunities generally were seen as not very helpful by respondents. In contrast, the free training places were generally seen as helpful, although the initial training assessment was less well received. Overall, though, these developments would suggest that for many workers, the degree of training assistance provided was a positive feature. However, as inferred above, skill reproduction entails measures to ensure the continuity of manufacturing skills. As such, the issue of skill atrophy and loss of traditional manufacturing skills could be problematic for long-term regional economic viability (see . It is to such issues that we turn next.
The Nature of the Policy Response and Lessons for Policy
Having been alerted at the beginning of 2005, the (now-disbanded) Regional Development Agency, Advantage West Midlands (AWM), and the national government were able to move quickly when MG-Rover finally collapsed, coming together to enact the 2 nd Rover Taskforce (RTF2). In the immediate aftermath of the closure, the state employment agency Job Centre Plus registered at least 5,300 ex MGR workers in 7 days to qualify for benefits. They took on 160 extra staff and worked a double shift to do so at the main office near
Longbridge (NAO, 2006). Pensions were transferred to the Pension Protection
Fund. To overcome the problem of being on benefits and the need to train or to take a job, rules were relaxed. Help for redundant workers also included job fairs, information on job opportunities, help from Job Centre Plus and free places on training courses. Help was also offered to spouses and partners to go on training courses. Employers were also paid a subsidy to employ ex-Rover workers and efforts were made through a 'Manufacturing Hub' to match manufacturing workers with jobs available in the sector. A one-stop employment and skills advice centre was set up locally, and local colleges put on extra courses. Of these, the most helpful support was found from our survey to be free travel to a training course or job interview, a free place on a training course, being sent on a training course by a new employer and help with setting up a business.
In this sense, a key policy lesson arising from the MG Rover experience is the need for agencies to move swiftly; it is helpful to have knowledge and actions in place rather than attempting to 'fire fight' after the event. Indeed, when MGR closed in April 2005, the second MGR Taskforce was able to start work on the day of the closure announcement. Such advance preparation work could work well in future closure situations, as it is unlikely that a future closure would happen without at least some prior warning. There is therefore a need for a 'permanent capacity' to deal with these issues, as a way of having institutional memory of how things were done. This is Finally, the 'success' story noted earlier in respect of retraining in the case of ex-MGR workers seems linked to the specific forms of training and education that were taken up and which provided skills of use in the local labour market. Training and education played a key role in particular in ensuring those who did not find reemployment quickly were not left unsupported.
Broader Perspectives 1: Wider Labour Market Precariousness
As such, the 2 nd Rover Taskforce was successful in many respects to facilitate adjustment, with partners working well together to devise innovative policies and to harness various agencies, with leadership shown by AWM, to help firms in the supply chain and to deliver quality services to those made redundant. Indeed, this reactive approach to the closure has been seen as something of 'textbook' task-force response in terms of quickly bringing together different organisations to provide support for workers and helping them into training and onto new jobs. However, our research suggests that this local success in helping workers adapt and move on was in effect mitigated by a broader labour market environment that is essentially precarious (BAILEY et al, 2012a) . Reinforcing this has been a lack of support for manufacturing more generally in the UK; only 30% of the ex MGR workers remained in manufacturing (and these were the workers who managed on average to maintain income levels). At the time of writing, the UK economy is effectively 'flat-lining' after a period when the automotive sector has grown more quickly than the rest of the economy (and is forecast to do so after some £6bn worth of investment by auto firms over the last two years), but going forward there is an acute issue of a shortage of skilled labour in the auto sector which could hold back growth. 12 The skills atrophy of MGR workers leaving a sector that is growing is illustrative of the lack of alignment of local/regional and national level policies.
Similarly, the public sector (some 20% of employed respondents had jobs in public administration, health and education in April 2008) now faces severe cuts.
Drawing on work by SHUTTLEWORTH et al. (2005), BAILEY et al (2012a) identified three dimensions that can be taken into account when examining the employment outcomes and trajectories of workers made redundant after a plant closure: (i) the personal attributes associated with workers employability and re-absorption in the labour market; (ii) the local demand and geographical mobility shaping their transition back to employment; and (iii) the effectiveness of the policy interventions, their uptake and how were they perceived by the workers. In this previous work , we argued that the effectiveness of the immediate post-closure policy response and longer term (pre-closure) local economic strategies combined with the state of local labour markets and workers' geographical mobility, helped to balance the impacts of personal attributes associated with workers' employability and re-absorption into the labour markets -hence the finding noted above of 90% of workers getting back into work three years on and 60% undertaking some form of training. In this regard, this was a 'successful' policy response.
However, in line with the precariousness framework of STANDING (1997, 2011), we would argue that this 'success' has to some extent been undermined more generally by the wider labour market conditions into which workers have had to move. 13 Here, there were significant falls in a number of measures such as labour market security (the security that comes from a government commitment to full employment), income security and representation security (representation rights at work) -which we see as dimensions of precariousness in line with Standing's work. In this regard, the particular lack of attention to labour market security has undermined and conflicted with other dimensions of security. Indeed, many workers interviewed in our Wave 3 survey were also likely to have lost their jobs again during the most recent downturn, reflecting the precariousness of the work they had to move into. Overall, we would argue that successful policy adjustments extend beyond merely providing "jobs" or "job opportunities" for displaced workers as politicians have stressed. Rather, they
extend to the quality of employment and lasting career opportunities. On that, the research presented here suggests that the picture for ex MG Rover workers is at best very mixed. For example, on the dimension of income security, our research found a majority of respondents reporting a significant decline in earnings compared to when they worked at MGR; and further that a quarter of respondents reported that they were experiencing financial difficulties. The findings also indicated a much greater dispersion of earnings. The decline in representation security reported also highlights the need to make sure that workers have adequate redress to advice and advocacy (traditionally provided by the union movement); and that measures are put in place to avoid a repeat of very sudden plant closures.
The implications of this analysis is that positive developments in labour security at the micro level can be undermined by adverse developments in labour market security at the macro-level; in turn compounding income, representation and skill reproduction insecurity. As such, low pay is the norm for many in the workforce and that more needs to be done to "make work pay" (ARMSTRONG et al., 2008) The policy response to the Longbridge crisis can also be characterised in terms of a set of shifting agendas and stakeholder coalitions that reflect an institutional divide between regional economic stakeholders (and the Taskforce), on the one hand, whose remit was to secure the regional supply chain and support the redundant workers, and neighbourhood social partners on the other, whose role was the mitigation of the local impacts of closure and facilitating future regeneration. It is possible to argue that the Taskforce narrative represents only a partial account of the Longbridge experience. As noted, rather than just focusing on the Taskforce responses, alternative narratives are needed so as to offer a more nuanced and holistic account, including the local impacts of closure, the role of the neighbourhood level officials and the third sector in mediating these.
Such local impacts include the "displacement" effect of the sudden increase in labour supply in South West Birmingham. In the decade prior to closure, the local unemployment (claimant) rate declined by half (CURS, 2008) . However, two years after closure, in the context of strong employment growth nationally, the proportion of local job seekers unemployed for more than 12 months had increased from 17% to 24% (ibid.). There was also significant local resentment that the short term needs of ex MGR workers were prioritised over the long term needs of the pre-existing Step Forward" programme, although this was also undermined by the "programme management" mentality of the statutory funding agencies. RCAT's prominent political profile and lobbying success of RCAT led it to eclipse the pre-existing community actors in the Longbridge narrative. The Task Force partners invested considerable capital into the embryonic association, effectively co-opting it into the coalition of key actors. As such, it was obliged to undergo a difficult transition from a radical 'campaigning' to a mainstream 'doing' orientation; a common trajectory for third sector organisations.
In summary, the ability of South West Birmingham to respond to the closure was constrained by the legacy of long-term in situ decline and limited local social capitalthe later attributable to the historic dominance of large 'paternalistic' employers which have run down over time. The Taskforce model indeed proved effective within its particular remit but was limited in scope (BENTLEY et. al., 2010b) . Its focus (on ex MG Rover workers and the supply chain), its composition (economic development agencies) and lines of accountability (to sponsor ministries) meant that it was poorly placed to deal with broader social and economic impacts. Nevertheless, Birmingham
City Council and local social partners attempted to fill that void. However, noting that regions are 'meeting places' for local and global forces and debates (BRISTOW, 2010), we have also attempted to move beyond the 'standard'
Conclusions
Taskforce narrative, recognising that whilst significant policy 'successes' were evident at the regional level in anticipating and responding to the crisis, a broader perspective is required that situates this Taskforce response in (i) a broadernationally driven -context of labour market precariousness (that in turn mitigates some of its policy 'successes'), and (ii) more local perspectives that highlight the local impacts of closure, the role of the neighbourhood level officials and the third sector in mediating these, plus the longer term regeneration challenge following the Taskforce's departure.
It is correct to note that rapid action by regional and local agencies as part of a coordinated response by policymakers to support, inform and retrain the MG Rover workers who lost their jobs can be called a 'success story' in that large-scale, longterm unemployment in the south Birmingham and wider West Midlands area was avoided. However, taking this broader perspective suggests that longer term, workers face a precarious situation and the need for policies to create and sustain 'good quality' jobs remains paramount. Adding in more local perspectives, and the key lesson from the Longbridge experience for dealing with closures more generally is that public policy responses to closures must be: multi-dimensional in that they transcend narrow sector based concerns and addresses broader spatial impacts, inclusive in that they build on a broad coalition of economic and social stakeholders;
and, long-term in that they acknowledge that adaptation takes many years. These may seem truisms but the Birmingham Longbridge experience demonstrates the difficulty of achieving such responses in the context of crisis where action is imperative and deliberation a luxury.
Furthermore, the Taskforce was clearly effective in its own terms but narrow in scope and time limited. Neighbourhood and social impacts were not included within its tightly defined brief. The responsibility for these problems was shouldered by less well-resourced organisations. So, looking more locally, while a local authority is a necessary actor in such a response, it is an imperfect vehicle given its very specific and restricted powers (at least in the British case -that may be different in other countries). Interviews with local authority staff reported a mismatch in their skills sets (the benefit system, debt advice) and the immediate needs of shocked and disoriented redundant workers (the need for remedial 'human' counselling). The local authority response was also restricted by a paucity of local voluntary and community sector organisations through which to channel programmes of assistance.
Conversely, local third sector groups were frustrated by the rules, regulations and 'project management' mind-set of major statutory organisations which, it can be argued, prioritised expenditure within prescribed timescales over innovation and investment for the future. If anything, the Longbridge experience illustrates the value for cities in investing in a vibrant third sector over the longer term.
